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A Spatial Testing of Fenno’s Six Committees:  





The purpose of this article is to test Fenno’s argument on the “environmental 
constraints” of the House standing committees presented in his Congressmen in 
Committees. The main task of the paper is to see if the “environmental constraints,” which 
are presumed to influence the internal committee politics, are reflected in the spatial 
configurations of Fenno’s six committees. In executing a spatial test, Rosenthal/Poole 
NOMINATE score was utilized. From the findings of the spatial test, we can conclude that 
Fenno’s observation on the environmental constraints of the six committees is generally 
supported. The committees under the constraints of parties and party leaders, such as the 
Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee, are also most 
heterogeneous and polarized in spatial terms. In contrast, the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
a committee under the influence of non-partisan foreign policy guidelines from the 
executive branch, and the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, a committee under the 
constraints of monolithic clientele groups, are most homogeneous and least polarized. The 
other two committees, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Appropriations 





It is well established that Richard Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees counts among 
the most important trend-setting works on the nature of standing committees in the 
House. It is one of the works most frequently cited in scholarly articles and books on 
legislative behavior. Besides, most graduate students majoring in American politics are 
usually supposed to read parts of the volume as a segment of reading assignments in the 
gateway courses on legislative behavior. No one doubts that it stands as one of the 
classics on the U.S. federal legislature. 
Among other things, the scholarly reputation of Congressmen in Committees can be 
partly attributed to the research question Fenno decides to answer. In Congressmen in 
Committees, Fenno aims at finding an answer to the question of how to generalize 
committee differences and similarities. Why do certain committees have particular 
groups of members in it, while others have different sorts of members? Under what 
environmental conditions do committees operate, and do the different environmental 
conditions have different influences on committee workings? How do member goals and 
environmental constraints in each committee affect the committee decision-making 
process? These questions are crucial to gain a deeper understanding of the House 
committee system in general, and Fenno addresses them in Congressmen in Committees. 
In the course of finding answers to these questions, Fenno introduces two 
independent variables (member goals and environmental constraints), one intervening 
variable (strategic premises), and two dependent variables (decision-making processes 
and decisions)(Fenno, 1973: 15-16). One of the main thrusts of Fenno’s argument is that 
member goals and environmental constraints combine to produce the “strategic 




decision-making takes place. In other words, according to Fenno, committee decisions 
and decision-making process can be properly understood as a combined outcome of the 
interaction of member goals and environmental constraints. 
One of the interesting components of Fenno’s thesis is that not only member goals 
but also environmental constraints of each committee matter in the committee decision-
making process. That is, the committee decision-making process is affected both by 
committee members and by extra-committee actors such as parties and clientele groups. 
This thesis means that committee members are not completely independent decision-
makers, but work in a way to fulfill the expectations of actors outside the committees. 
Furthermore, Fenno differentiates the context within which each committee operates 
(Fenno 1973, chapter 2 “Environmental Constraints”). And Fenno’s analysis shows that 
the contextual differences make committees presumed to have the same kind of goals 
distinguish one from the other. For example, Fenno argues that, although the members in 
the Education and Labor Committee and those in the Foreign Affairs Committee pursue 
the same kind of goals, the internal workings of the two committees are remarkably 
different due to their environmental constraints. That is, while the Education and Labor 
Committee works under the strong influence of parties and thus tends to be more prone 
to partisan conflict, the Foreign Affairs Committee operates under the relatively uniform 
influence of the executive branch and make its decisions in a bipartisan way.  
Given the importance of the external constraints in each committee’s decision-
making process, this article attempts to see if Fenno’s description of the various 
environmental constraints provided in “Environmental Constraints,” chapter 2 of 
Congressmen in Committees, can be confirmed by the spatial configurations of each 
committee.1 If the environmental constraints really matter, it will affect the membership 
composition of each committee, thus resulting in different levels of polarity and 
homogeneity across committees. Certainly, we can expect the committee members under 
the influence of parties to be partisans themselves and those under the influences of 
divided clientele groups to be more prone to conflict.  
As a matter of fact, Fenno himself agrees on the close relationship between the 
committee environments and the committee membership composition in a couple of 
segments of chapter 2 in Congressmen in Committees. For example, he maintains that 
“[W]hen party leaders make appointments to Ways and Means, they make policy 
orthodoxy a test of membership. Candidates from both parties are checked to make sure 
they adhere to the party position on such matters as trade and medicare and to ascertain 
whether they will follow the party leaders …”(Fenno 1973: 25). In addition, with respect 
to the Education and Labor Committee, he continues to state that “Education and Labor 
members face partisan-ideological constraints to a degree unmatched by any of the other 
five committees ….the AFL-CIO devotes enormous resources of manpower, money, and 
organization to help elect liberal Democratic Presidents and Congressmen – including 
members of the Education and Labor Committee”(Fenno 1973: 34). Supporting Fenno’s 
argument, Parker and Parker also say that “factional alignments” within committees 
derived from the environmental constraints affect each committee’s decision-making 
                                                        
1 In this paper, the “spatial configurations” of the committee refer to the level of homogeneity 
and polarity of each committee. The spatial configurations of the committees analyzed in this 
paper are presented in section 4. 
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(Parker and Parker 1979). 
With the aim of seeing if the environment constraints are reflected in the spatial 
configurations of Fenno’s six committees,2 this paper will proceed as follows. In section 
2, the historical background against which Congressmen in Committees can be best 
understood will be presented first. Among other things, the important roles of the 
standing committees in legislative process will be briefly described. In addition, the main 
features of the House of Representatives during the 1950s and 1960s will be presented in 
a very condensed form.3 Next, the contribution of Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees 
will be described by focusing on how his work is related to the other literature on 
legislative behavior. Among other things, it will be highlighted that, by postulating that a 
member actually has multiple goals and motivations, Fenno broke fresh ground for more 
realistic, sophisticated, and nuanced research on members’ behavior in the legislative 
arena. In addition, it will be shown how Fenno’s emphasis on the importance of the 
environmental constraints was supported and criticized by other scholars on legislative 
behavior. 
In section 3, the major characteristics of Fenno's six committees will be pointed out 
on the basis of the information Fenno himself provides. The purpose of this 
recapitulation is preliminary. That is, to see if the outcome of spatial analysis to be 
presented in section 4 fits Fenno’s description of the environmental constraints, we need 
to be familiar with Fenno’s discussion on the nature of committee environments. Most of 
the description on the six committees in this section will be confined to members’ 
expected goals when they seek to be assigned to certain types of committees and to the 
environmental constraints surrounding each committee. 
In section 4, a spatial analysis will be executed to test Fenno’s argument on the 
environmental constraints of the six committees. For the purpose of testing the 
relationship of the environmental constraints and the level of polarity and homogeneity 
of each committee, important statistics such as committee medians and committee party 
medians will be utilized.4 And the final section will summarize the whole argument and 
suggest further research. 
 
                                                        
2 The six committees in Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees (1973) are: the Post Office and 
Civil Service, the Interior and Insular Affairs, the Education and Labor, the Foreign Affairs, the 
Ways and Means, the Appropriations Committees. After the publication of Fenno’s Congressmen 
in Committees, there have been a couple of House reforms in which some of the committees 
investigated in Fenno’s work were abolished or renamed. At present(the year 2000), the Post 
Office and Civil Service Committee is no more in existence. The Education and Labor Committee, 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee were renamed the 
Education and the Workforce Committee, the International Relations Committee, the Resources 
Committee respectively. There is no change in name to the Ways and Means Committee and the 
Appropriations Committee. 
3 This preliminary description seems necessary, because Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees 
was written based on the data collected during this period, which was a modal era of the so-called 
“committee government.” The preliminary description will help to understand the status of 
Fenno’s work on the House committees from a historical perspective. 
4 I use Rosenthal/Poole NOMINATE score to obtain important spatial data. More information 
on Rosenthal/Poole NOMINATE score is provided in Appendix. The NOMINATE score used in 




2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF FENNO’S CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES  
AND ITS CONTRIBUTION 
 
2.1. Historical Context of Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees 
 
As Woodrow Wilson succinctly described in his Congressional Government, 
Congress at work is “Congress in its committee rooms”(Wilson 1885, 69). Although he 
argued for the case of British-style party government by revealing the problems of the 
decentralized committee government, the committee system is one of the most important 
features of the U. S. House of Representatives compared to other western parliamentary 
democracies.5 Since its inception as an information producer in the early 19th century 
(Cooper 1970), the House committee system was institutionalized in the late 19th century 
and early 20th century, responding to the social demands of industrialization and 
symbolizing the division of labor in the House (Polsby 1968). 
The Wilsonian hope of party government in Congress had gradually broken down by 
the early 20th century, when the despotic Republican Speaker Joseph Cannon was 
dethroned in 1910. Committee chairmen took the vacancy left over by powerful party 
leadership, establishing a decentralized, bargaining-oriented committee government, 
which took its full-blown shape in the 1950s and 1960s (Polsby 1968). Since 1910, 
under the committee government, the role of the House Speaker was marginalized, while 
the committee chairmen reigned with the aid of the strong seniority norm.  
Although the committee system has been a recurrent target of a series of House 
reforms from time to time, the roles committees play in the House are crucial. The 
committees mark up bills; they hold hearings for legislation; they are the factories of 
legislative information. In comparison to the Westminster-style parliamentary system, in 
which the cabinet is in charge of managing and overseeing the initial stage of bill-
markup, and the whole floor is emphasized as the central stage of legislative process, the 
committees in the House take legislative initiative, leading the flow of bills up to the 
conference committee stage. Although there is some controversy why congressional 
committees are powerful,6 students on the U.S. federal legislature tend to agree that the 
congressional committees are powerful, because they are full of policy experts. In this 
light, Krehbiel emphasizes the informational role of the committees (Krehbiel 1992). 
                                                        
5 There seems to be a general agreement among scholars of comparative legislature that the 
U.S. Congress is characterized by the policy-making strength of standing committees. See Nelson 
Polsby’s “Legislatures,” Michael Mezey’s “Classifying Legislatures,” and Malcolm Shaw’s 
“Committees in Legislatures” in Philip Norton, ed. 1990, Legislatures, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
6 The controversy was a debate between Shepsle and Weingast (1987) and Krehbiel (1987). 
Refuting the deference thesis that committees are powerful, because fellow congressmen respect 
their expertise, Shepsle and Weingast maintain that congressional committees are powerful due to 
their institutional position. According to them, the committees are respected, because they play the 
role of gate-keeper at the initial stage of law-making and, again, because they determine the fate of 
the bill at the last stage, i.e., at the stage of conference committee. They call the committee power 
at the conference committee stage “ex post” veto power. Krebiel, in his critique of Shepsle and 
Weingast, contends that the “ex post” veto power argument is empirically restricted and, instead, 
suggests the “deference” the members show to the committee expertise is a true source of 
committee power.   
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And Kingdon highlights committee members’ role as cue-givers in non-committee 
members’ voting decisions on the floor (Kingdon 1989, 83-88). 
In its turn, Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees is a product of the very period in 
which the committee power was most visible and the committee chairmen were at the 
center of the House legislative process. In other words, the work is based on the 
information and data the author gathered during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the 
so-called “committee government” was at its peak. During the period, the 
institutionalization of committee government took its full-blown shape. Committee 
chairmen were able to wield enormous power toward the other members of the House. 
Seniority norm was strong among the members in determining committee chairmanship. 
The role of House Speaker was minimized as a broker and bargainer among committee 
chairmen. 7  The role of freshmen Congressmen was still relegated to that of 
apprenticeship. The norm of reciprocity, captured in the aphorism “to get along, go 
along,” was almost taken as catechism. If nothing else, Fenno’s Congressmen in 
Committees is one of the works which best describe the tides and circumstances of the 
House in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
 
2.2. Contribution of Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees 
 
As a trend-setter, Fenno’s work contributed to our understanding of the U. S. House 
of Representatives in a couple of ways. First, before the publication of Fenno’s 
Congressmen in Committees, we did not know in a systematic fashion why a member 
wants to be assigned (or reassigned) to a certain type of committees for what purpose. 
We frequently asked, “why does a member of the House seek to be assigned to a certain 
committee” and “what kind of circumstances around a certain committee determines its 
policy outcome?” We had some literature such as Manley’s “Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in 
Congressional Influence,” which was at best a case study as far as the internal workings 
of committees are concerned.  
In contrast, Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees successfully fills an important 
research gap by revealing what each member’s goal is when s/he seeks to be assigned to 
certain types of committees. By comparing various committees, he shows us the 
relationship of a member’s goal in a specific committee, the committee’s environmental 
circumstances, and the nature of policy outcome of the committee. Simply put, Fenno’s 
Congressmen in Committees succeeded in generalizing committee differences and 
similarities by taking “member goals” and “environmental constraints” as important 
explanatory variables. 
Second, in contrast to such a work as Mayhew’s Congress: the Electoral Connection 
(1974), Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees shows that the goals a member can pursue 
are actually multiple. While Mayhew tends to overemphasize the priority of “reelection 
goal,” Fenno contends that a member of the House seeks multiple goals such as getting 
reelected, making good public policy and gaining the influence in the House. Rather than 
taking a member’s goal as fixed, as formal theorists often do, Fenno argues that a 
                                                        
7 On the weakened status of party leadership in the era of committee government, see Jones 




member can have multiple goals depending on her or his schooling, constituency, etc. 
For the next generations of scholars on legislative behavior, Fenno’s explanation on 
the multiplicity of member goals often times strengthened the positions of empiricists in 
their criticism of formal theorists. For example, Richard Hall, refuting formal theorists’ 
argument that a member’s goal is fixed and singular, contends that a member’s goal is 
not fixed but bill-specific and that a categorical and a priori statement of a member’s 
goal should be more nuanced and cautious (Hall 1987). 8  In addition, Kingdon’s 
Congressmen’s Voting Decision also states that members’ goals are evoked depending on 
issues at hand (Kingdon 1989: 247).9 Although more sophisticated, conditional, and 
realistic research on members’ behavior does not solely rely on him, it cannot be denied 
that he broadened research frontier by identifying the multiple goals a member has in the 
legislative arena.    
Finally, Fenno’s emphasis on the environmental constraints as well as on member 
goals opened a new horizon for research on the influence of extra-committee actors. 
According to Fenno, the decision-making process in each committee cannot be regarded 
solely as reflecting the goals and preferences of committee members. Rather, the policy 
outcome is better understood as a result of the interaction of member goals and 
environmental constraints. Since the publication of Congressmen in Committees, Fenno’s 
argument on the environmental constraints received both support and indirect criticism. 
Taking a cue from Fenno, for example, Parker and Parker highlighted the importance of 
committee “factions” and concluded that the influence of the House and the party is most 
heavily reflected in committees’ voting patterns(Parker and Parker 1979). In contrast to 
the supporting tone of Parker and Parker, Price emphasized the level of “issue salience” 
and “group conflict” as major environmental factors. Rather than associating a particular 
type of committees with the influence of particular outside actors, as Fenno did, Price 
contended that the variation of internal committee workings depends on issues at hand 
(Price 1978). In this way, Fenno’s taking of the environmental constraints as an 
important independent variable provided the soil for the development of the kind of 
research which takes the extra-committee factors as a major independent variable.  
In conclusion, Fenno’s Congressmen in Committees enriched our understanding of 
the operation of the House standing committees and paved the way for further research. 
By comparing various committees on the basis of member goals and environmental 
constraints, it enabled us to make a generalization about committee politics. The thesis 
that a member has multiple goals helped us to redirect attention from members’ 
reelection-related activities to their activities for gaining the House influence and for 
                                                        
8 Hall’s argument is further strengthened in his later work(Hall, 1996). Instead of saying a 
member has goals in abstract form, he argues that “[W]hat matters is the relevance of one or 
another kind of interest in the calculation of the behavioral moment, which depends in turn on the 
issue being considered. The behavioral effect of any abstract purpose, in other words, is contingent 
on the object of legislative action, subjectively perceived by the actor”(Hall 1996, 75). 
9 Kingdon, after saying that “[T]heir(members’: parenthesis mine) behavior is purposive, and 
is not simply reaction to external forces. But if they are goal-seekers, we need to identify the goals 
that seem to affect most legislators most of the time. Adapting categories used by Richard Fenno, 
representatives can be realistically portrayed as pursuing some combination of the following three 
primary goals,” identifies “satisfying constituencies,” “intra-Washington influence,” and “good 
public policy” as the three primary goals members pursue (Kingdon 1989, 245-247). 
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making good public policy. Besides, Fenno’s emphasis on the importance of the 
environmental constraints showed us that the level of conflict or cooperation in the 
internal politics of committee decision-making reflects the changes in external factors. 
 
 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF FENNO’S SIX COMMITTEES 
 
In this section, the characteristics of Fenno’s six committees will be described. The 
six Fenno committees in the House are the Post Office and Civil Service, the Interior and 
Insular Affairs, the Education and Labor, the Foreign Affairs, the Ways and Means, and 
the Appropriations Committees.10 The “member goals” in each committee addresses the 
question of “why a member seeks membership on the specific committee,” and the 
“environmental constraints” addresses the question of “which outsiders have the greatest 
capacity to affect each committee member’s pursuing her/his goal.” A member may have 
multiple goals in seeking a committee assignment, and s/he may work under multiple 
environmental constraints. Fenno, admitting that modal characterization runs the risk of 
oversimplifications, maintains that these generalizations can be good predictors of the 
different behavior of members in different types of committees. The important 
characteristics of the six committees are as follows.11 
According to Fenno, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Interior 
and Insular Affairs Committee count among reelection-oriented committees, and their 
policy coalitions are largely led by clientele groups. Among other things, members in the 
two committees seek to serve the interests of their constituents. The members in the Post 
Office and Civil Service Committee are largely interested in the welfare of federal postal 
and civil employees and mail users; those in the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
are in the welfare of specific congressional constituencies on project basis. 
Despite the similarities of members’ goals in each committee and the environmental 
constraints surrounding each committee, Fenno notes that the two committees also have 
differences in the nature and composition of clientele groups. Fenno says that the 
clientele groups of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee are relatively monolithic, 
composed of mail delivers and mail users, and relatively less prone to possible conflict 
among them, while those of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee are more 
pluralistic, much less circumscribing, and more prone to possible conflict. 
                                                        
10 The jurisdictions of each committee are as follows (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
1962: 48-58).  
a. the Post Office and Civil Service Committee: postal and federal civil services; census, 
national archives 
b. the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee: public lands, natural resources, territorial 
possessions of the U.S., Indian affairs. 
c. the Education and Labor Committee: education, labor and welfare matters 
d. the Foreign Affairs Committee: relations of the United States with other nations and 
international organizations and movements 
e. the Ways and Means Committee: revenue measures generally; tariffs 
f. the Appropriations Committee: appropriation of government revenues; reciprocal trade 
agreement; social security 
11 The characteristics of the Fenno's six committees are based on “Member Goals” and 




The goals of the members in the Education and Labor Committee and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee are making good public policy. The members come to the committee 
with the aim of marking himself on the policy. Members in the Education and Labor 
Committee are largely partisans; they attempt to carry the ideology of their parties over 
into specific policies. Those in the Foreign Affairs Committee want to contribute to the 
successful implementation of the administration’s foreign policy proposals by supporting 
presidential initiatives. 
Goal similarity does not, however, cover up the differences in the environmental 
constraints of the two committees. The Education and Labor Committee works 
surrounded by the policy coalitions led by parties, while the Foreign Affairs Committee 
does surrounded by the policy coalitions led by the executive. In contrast to the 
Education and Labor Committee, the general mood within the Foreign Affairs 
Committee is bipartisan; the Committee works not as a partisan reviewer of the 
executive foreign policy proposals, but as a legitimating and supporting partner of the 
foreign policy recommendations of the executive. 
The primary goal of members in the Ways and Means Committee and the 
Appropriations Committee is gaining influence in the House. As committees in charge of 
taxing and spending, the two committees are most powerful committees and are 
expected to be responsive to the general sentiment of the House. As a result, the 
members of the House as a whole constrain the two committees as a major institutional 
environment. 
Fenno also notes differences when he talks about the policy coalitions surrounding 
the two committees. The Ways and Means Committee also works under the policy 
coalitions led by executive-plus-party. Party leaders such as House party leadership and 
the President are primarily concerned with electoral relevance of the policy output of the 
Committee; the Committee deals with policy areas, such as trade, social security, 
taxation, and Medicare, which are generally regarded as the arena of frequent partisan 
disagreement. In contrast, the policy coalitions surrounding the Appropriations 
Committee do not have equally strong partisan tone. Instead, the policy coalitions of the 
Committee are largely led by the executive. The executive agencies are the primary 
beneficiary of the funds allocated by the Committee; the executive agencies originate 
budget requests and aggregate them. The executive agencies, rather than the party, are in 
a more influential position in the Committee’s decision-making process. 
 
 
4. SPATIAL TEST OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS OF  
THE SIX COMMITTEES 
 
4.1. Outcome of Spatial Test 
 
The different characteristics of Fenno’s six committees in terms of committee 
member’s goal and each committee’s environmental constraints (institutional and/or 
policy coalitions) are presented in Table 1. A summary table of the spatial statistics 
including the level of homogeneity and polarity of each committee is presented in Table 2. 
Finally, spatial configurations of each committee are presented in Figure.1. 
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Table 1. Committee Characteristics 
 
 PC I E FA W AP 
Member’s goal Reelection Reelection Good 
























PC: the Post Office and Civil Service Committee 
I: the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
E: the Education and Labor Committee 
FA: the Foreign Affairs Committee 
W: the Ways and Means Committee 




Table 2. Summary Table of Spatial Statistics 
 




The Post Office              
and Civil 
Service Committee 
.077 -.158 .288 .25 .446 
The Interior  
and Insular 
Affairs Committee 




-.263 -.398 .3125 0 .7105 
The Foreign 
Affairs Committee 
-.121 -.355 .155 .24 .510 
The Ways and 
Means Committee 
-.08 -.281 .371 0 .652 
The Appropriations 
Committee 






Figure 1. Spatial Configurations of the Six Committees 
                                                        
12 I take the distance between the median of the Democratic contingents and that of the 





The Post Office and Civil Service Committee 
 
 
XCD:-.158   0 XC:.077  XCR:.288 
 
The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
 
 
      XCD:-.257      0 XC:.112  XCR:.288 
 
The Education and Labor Committee 
 
 
   XCD:-.398   XC:-.263        0            XCR:.3125 
 
The Foreign Affairs Committee 
 
 
    XCD:-.355         XC:-.121 0  XCR:.155 
 
The Ways and Means Committee 
 
 
          XCD:-.281    XC:-.08 0                   XCR:.371 
 
The Appropriations Committee 
 
 
                    XCD:-.161 0 XC:.0845             XCR:.377 
 
XC: the committee median 
XCD: the median of the Democratic contingents in the committee 
XCR: the median of the Republican contingents in the committee 
 
Before analyzing the spatial test outcome in the next subsection, some remarks are in 
order with respect to the method to measure the homogeneity(or heterogeneity) of each 
committee. There are a couple of ways of measuring the level of homogeneity of 
committee composition. On testing the level of committee homogeneity, Krehbiel says 
that “to test whether committees are significantly more homogeneous than the House, a 
median-based approximation is obtained by ascertaining whether, for any given 
committee, its Democratic and Republican median members are both on the same side of 
the House median. When this condition holds, the committee is said to be homogeneous 
since majorities of committee members of both parties have ratings that exceed those of 
a majority of the House....When this condition does not hold, the committee is said to be 
heterogeneous since committee members’ preferences are sufficiently different from one 
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another that a committee majority of only one party has ratings that exceed those of a 
majority of the House” (Krehbiel 1992: 127). Given the House median of .033 and the 
committee medians presented in Table 2, all the committees I selected are 
“heterogeneous” if I faithfully follow Krehbiel’s method. 
Given the fact that Krehbiel’s method of measuring the homogeneity of committees 
is to see if the committees are homogeneous or heterogeneous on the basis of the 
committee composition around the House median, all the committees I selected can be 
categorized as heterogeneous, since the medians of Democratic and Republican 
contingents in each committee are separated with the House median in the middle 
between them. Although all the committees I selected are heterogeneous in Krehbiel's 
terms, there is still variance in the degree of heterogeneity of each committee. All I am 
interested in is not to see whether a committee is categorically homogeneous and 
heterogeneous, but to see the relative degree of homogeneity and heterogeneity of each 
committee. Therefore, rather than focusing on whether each committee is categorically 
heterogeneous or homogeneous as Krehbiel did, I will utilize a different approach on 
measuring the degree of homogeneity and heterogeneity of each committee. 
One such measure is to see the portion of the members in each committee between 
the most liberal Republicans and the most conservative Democrats. I argue that as this 
portion increases, the members of Democratic and Republican parties interpenetrate into 
each other and the committee is more homogeneous. This portion normalized to 
committee size is as follows: 6/24 ≅ 25% (the Post Office and Civil Service Committee), 
6/31 ≅ 19.4% (the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee), 0/31 ≅ 0% (the Education 
and Labor Committee), 8/33 ≅ 24% (the Foreign Affairs Committee), 0/25 ≅ 0% (the 
Ways and Means Committee), 8/50 ≅ 16% (the Appropriations Committee). This result 
makes a clear distinction between the degrees of homogeneity of committees as in the 
case of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee 
on the one hand and the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means 
Committee on the other hand. 
 
4.2. Analysis of the Outcome 
 
After all the important committee statistics are taken into consideration, the six 
committees show differentiated characteristics in terms of polarity and homogeneity. The 
spatial configuration of each committee generally fits Fenno’s description of the 
environmental constraints of each committee.  
Among other committees, the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and 
Means committee, which I regard as partisan committees relying on Fenno’s observation 
on the environmental constraints of the two committees, also show the levels of 
homogeneity and polarization we can expect of partisan committees. The Education and 
Labor Committee is most heterogeneous and most polarized among the six committees. 
The degree of homogeneity of the Committee (= 0) is lowest; the difference between the 
medians of the Democratic contingents and Republican contingents in the Committee 
(= .7105) is largest. The Ways and Means Committee is also most heterogeneous and 
polarized; the degree of homogeneity of the Committee (= 0) is lowest; the difference 




Committee (= .652) is second large. 
On the other hand, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee are the most homogeneous committees, a fact that also strengthens 
Fenno’s description on the environmental constraints of the two committees. The degree 
of homogeneity of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee (= .25) is highest; the 
difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and Republican 
contingents in the Committee (= .446) is lowest. The degree of homogeneity of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee (= .24) is second high; the difference between the medians of 
the Democratic contingents and Republican contingents in the Committee (= .510) is 
second small. Viewed in light of the spatial information, the Post Office and Civil 
Service Committee fits Fenno’s description in that it is less prone to internal polarity, 
showing the highest degree of homogeneity. Fenno’s observation also works with the 
case of the Foreign Affairs Committee. According to the spatial configuration, the 
Committee is not a partisan committee, but a relatively homogeneous one legitimating 
the foreign policy of the executive branch in the spirit of bipartisanship. 
Between the dyad of the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means 
Committee and that of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee lie the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Appropriations 
Committee. Although the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee belongs to reelection-
oriented committees along with the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, Fenno 
notes the difference in the nature and composition of the clientele groups of the two 
committees. While the clientele groups of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee 
are relatively monolithic, those of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee are less 
monolithic, less circumscribing and more prone to conflict due to their pluralistic nature.  
Reflecting Fenno’s description of the environmental constraints of the two 
committees, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee is less homogeneous than the 
Post Office and Civil Service Committee, but more homogeneous than the Education 
and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee. The degree of homogeneity 
of the Committee (= .19) lies between that of the Post Office and Civil Service 
Committee and those of the Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means 
Committee; the difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and 
Republican contingents in the Committee (= .539) is higher than that of the Post Office 
and the Civil Service Committee but lower than those of the Education and Labor 
Committee and the Ways and Means Committee.  
On the other hand, the case of the Appropriations Committee does not need much 
explanation. As a committee constrained by the House and the executive, its degree of 
homogeneity and the difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and 
Republican contingents in the Committee are roughly in the middle and as expected. Its 
degree of homogeneity (=.16) is higher than the partisan committees such as the 
Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee, but lower than 
the reelection-oriented committees(the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and the 
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee) and the bipartisan Foreign Affairs Committee. 
The difference between the medians of the Democratic contingents and of the 
Republican contingents in the Committee (= .538) is smaller than those of the two 
partisan committees, but larger than that of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee 
and than that of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and almost equal to that of the Interior 
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Given the information provided in sections 3 and 4, we can conclude that Fenno’s 
observation on the environmental constraints of the six committees is generally 
supported by the spatial test. The committees under the constraints of parties, such as the 
Education and Labor Committee and the Ways and Means Committee, are most 
heterogeneous and polarized in spatial terms. On the other hand, the bipartisan Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the non-divisive Post Office and Civil Service Committee show 
the highest degree of homogeneity and the least level of polarity. The other two 
committees, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Appropriations 
Committee, lie in between.  
While Fenno’s description of the environmental constraints of the six committees is 
well captured in the spatial configurations, we should not forget his Congressmen in 
Committees is time-bound. That is, his research was conducted during the late 1950s and 
the 1960s, a year before the House reform of the mid-1970s and about three decades 
before the Republican capture of Congress in 1994. One of the committees he 
investigated, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, is now gone; other 
committees were renamed and experienced significant changes in nature. The Foreign 
Affairs Committee, for example, had changed into a partisan committee during the 
Reagan Presidency (McCormick 1993: 136). Again, the Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee became more and more prone to internal conflict due to the upsurge of 
environmentalism.    
Given these changes, further research in order is to test again Fenno’s observation on 
the environmental constraints of various committees and to see if there are any 
significant changes in the nature of the external conditions. There should be some 
changes. And, if we can, an additional spatial test together with an interview method and 
qualitative analysis is to be executed in order to have a deeper understanding of the 
environmental constraints of various committees and of the influence of these constraints 



















In this article, I used NOMINATE (Nominal Three-step Estimation) score developed 
by Poole and Rosenthal to test Fenno's argument on the six committees. The score is not 
a policy-specific data, but a data measuring the liberalness (or conservativeness) of a 
member based on all the roll calls in each House (In this article I used the data on the 
87th House(1961-1962)). The NOMINATE score taps the degree to which a member of 
the House is liberal or conservative. The smaller the number is, the more liberal a 
member is. The liberal/conservative scale generated by NOMINATE is bounded between 
-1 and 1. If a member's NOMINATE score is -1, s/he is perfectly liberal, while, if a 
member's NOMINATE score is 1, s/he is perfectly conservative. The primary reason for 
using NOMINATE score in this article is that the score fits my research purpose, which 
is to describe the characteristics of the six committees through an inter-committee 
comparison of the various policy positions of each committee. With policy specific data, 
it is impossible to compare the preferences of various actors across the committees. In 
addition, according to Poole and Rosenthal's test, the liberal-conservative dimension, 
which is NOMINATE score is all about, covers about 80 % of all other dimensions. This 
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